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COMMENTS
HAS GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF UTILITIES
PROVEN A FAILURE?
The case of United States Railways and Electric Company of
Baltimore v. West' is another pronouncement of the United
States Supreme Court upon the subject of rate regulation. The
United Railways of Baltimore applied to the Public Service
Commission of Maryland for an increase in fares. The United
Railways had $24,000,000 of common stock, $38,000,000 of ordi-
nary bonded indebtedness, and $14,000,000 of redeemable income
bonds. The commission fixed the present value of the property
of the company at $75,000,000, but this valuation included an
item of $5,000,000 for easements in the streets given by Balti-
more. The reason for the inclusion of this item was a decision
of the Court of Appeals of Maryland that easements were sub-
ject to taxation. The commission at first allowed $883,544 for
depreciation which was 5% of the gross earnings; but later after
the Court of Appeals of Maryland had ordered the commission
to base depreciation on the present value of the depreciable prop-
erty, the commission added $755,116 for depreciation, or 1.08%
on a rate basis of $70,000,000. The rates finally allowed by the
commission would earn 6.26% on a rate base of $75,000,000
after the allowance of $1,638,660 for depreciation, and they
would have earned 7.78% on a rate base of $70,000,000 with a
depreciation of $883,544. On appeal from a decision of the
Court of Appeals of Maryland in favor of the commission, the
United States Supreme Court held that rates should have been
granted which would yield a return of "not far from" 8% on a
rate base of $75,000,000 with a depreciation of $1,638,,660, and
reversed the Court of Appeals of Maryland. The rate of return
authorized by the United States Supreme Court would have
amounted to nearly 10% on the $70,000,000 rate base and the
lower estimate of depreciation.
The Supreme Court overlooked the fact that over two-thirds
of all the money invested in the business was borrowed money.
The evidence does not show what interest was being paid on this
150 S. Ct. 123 (1930).
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money. It certainly was not over 7%. It probably was not over
6%, and some of it may not have been over 5%. The difference
between this interest rate and the 8% rate of return allowed by
the Supreme Court on the entire value of the property would, of
course, go to the common stock-owners, who, as a result, might
get upwards of 15% on the $70,000,000 rate base and the 5%
allowance for depreciation (after allowance for taxes and op-
erating expenses).
This decision raises three interesting questions. First, the
question of whether depreciation should be figured according to
present cost; second, the question of whether the easements
granted the company ought to be included in the rate base; and
third, the question of whether the proper rate of return was
allowed.
The majority of the court thought that because the rate base
is required by the latest decisions of the United States Supreme
Court to be figured according to present value, depreciation
should be figured on the same basis. Mr. Justice Brandeis, dis-
senting, took the position that the purpose of the depreciation
allowance is to restore the cost of value of the original invest-
ment. He contended that it was a mere bookkeeping device, and
that the depreciation charge had uniformly been based on the
original cost, both by business men and by official practice. Mr.
Justice Stone, dissenting, added that even if the replacement of
the plant rather than the restoration of the cost was the function
of the depreciation account, the commission and the courts were
not dealing with present replacements, but those to be made at
uncertain dates in the future of articles purchased at different
times in the past at varying price levels, and, therefore, that
there was no reason for applying the doctrine of present repro-
duction value. It would seem as though the dissenting justices
had made points hard to meet, especially in the view of the fact
that the law permits public utilities both to deduct from income
for depreciation and to add to rate base for appreciation without
additional payment.2
The majority opinion evidently was inclined to include the
value of the easements in the rate base, although it intimated
that the objection came too late. Justice Brandeis points out
that calling the privileges given to the company easements would
not differentiate them for rate purposes from ordinary corporate
2 30 Col. L. Rev. 330.
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franchises, and in deciding the rate base, the Supreme Court fol-
lows Federal law rather than state law, and that the question
of its allowance was properly before the court on appeal because
the fact appeared in the record and it affected the question of
whether a proper rate of return had been allowed. On this point
clearly Justice Brandeis would seem to be right.
The majority took the position that the company was entitled
to a net return of not far from 8% upon the valuation fixed by
the commission. The dissenting judges did not take issue with
the majority on this point. Evidently, both of them overlooked
the fact that the common stockholders could appropriate to them-
selves the difference between what they could borrow money for
and what the Supreme Court was allowing upon the entire valua-
tion. Of course, it is impossible to foresee what the position of
the Supreme Court would have been if it had discussed this point,
but it would seem self-evident that if 8% is a reasonable rate
of return and the owners are entitled to no more, the problem
should be solved so as to give them no more. Without this possi-
bility, it is hard to understand why the Supreme Court put the
rate of return so high as even 8%. It is a well known fact that
investors generally are satisfied with a return of six per cent
and even five per cent in the case of safe investments, often
before not after the payment of taxes.
The case of the United Railways and Electric Company v.
West is in accord with recent decisions of the United States Su-
preme Court. In the case of McCardle v. Indianapolis Water
Company3 the Supreme Court practically adopted reproduction
cost as a basis for determining the rate base, including going
value, and in St. Louis and O'Fallon Railway v. United States4
it held that the phrase "the law of the land" in the Transporta-
tion Act of 1920 required consideration of reproduction cost in
a way to give it special emphasise in the determination of the
rate base (according to present value). Now the case of United
Railways and Electric Company v. West has decided that the
item of depreciation must be figured on the same basis and even
that property in the way of easements donated to the company
may be included in the rate base. All of the cases have more or
less agreed upon the rate of return, although recently the rate
of return has been pushed up from around 6% to around 8%.
3 272 U. S. 400.
4 49 S. Ct. 384.
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Yet such decisions as these are raising the question of whether
or not governmental regulation has not proven a failure and
now might as well be abandoned.
In the case of businesses where there is a virtual monopoly in
an indispensable service, which, according to the most recent
test of the United States Supreme Court,5 are classified as busi-
nesses affected with a public interest, there are four courses
open:
1. Allow the business to continue as a virtual monopoly, but
under private ownership without being affected with a public
interest, and therefore free from all regulation;
2. Break up the monopoly and enforce competition;
3. Regulate on the theory of the law of public callings; and
4. Adopt the policy of government ownership, either (a)
with government operation, or (b) private operation under
contract.
The first course is probably the course which would be pre-
ferred by the private owners and the course which governs them
in their own relations to the problem, but it is a course which
probably they do not hope to get and which the people of the
country certainly would never allow them to get. Under these
circumstances, it may be wondered why the public utility owners
are pursuing the course which they do pursue. However, history
often affords an explanation. It is hard now to understand the
position of the Bourbons. People ought not to hope that what
has happened in the past may not continue to happen in the
future.
The second course was that favored by such men as former
President Woodrow Wilson and many others with his viewpoint,
but it is coming to be believed that this course is unworkable.
The conflict between political theory, even if universally adopted,
and economic laws, on one hand, and business practice, on the
other hand, is too great. Competition cannot be adequately en-
forced in the realm of public utilities.
The third course has been the theory under which public utili-
ties and big businesses have been governed throughout most of
our history. It became a pronounced policy in the United States
with the Granger Movement and the decision of the case of
5 Charles Wolfe Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Rel's., 262 U. S. 522;
Tyson v. Banton, 47 S. Ct. 426; Ribneck v. McBride, 48 S. Ct. 545; Williams
v. Standard Oil Co., 49 S. Ct. 115; Tagg Bros. v. U. S., 50 S. Ct. 220.
COMMENTS
Munn v. fllinois6 by the United States Supreme Court in 1876,
and it has been growing in extent and importance ever since
that time. This was the position of former President Theodore
Roosevelt, although in this and in championing the prosecutions
under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, he, in true cowboy fashion,
tried to ride two horses going in opposite directions. Under the
law of public callings any business which is affected with a public
interest must (a) serve all (b) with reasonably adequate facili-
ties (c) without discrimination (d) for reasonable compensa-
tion (e) either with an insurance liability for the safety of
goods, or with a negligence liability for other matters; and gov-
ernment has the right and power to regulate such businesses
for the purpose of enforcing all of these obligations. The busi-
nesses which under the test of virtual monopoly and indispensa-
ble service are affected with a public interest include such com-
panies as railroads, street railroads, express, motor transporta-
tion, sleeping car, telegraph, telephone, gas, electric, and public
utility companies generally. Some of these businesses are intra-
state in scope, and others are interstate. Most of them are
extensive and powerful. Those which are interstate come under
the regulation of the Federal government and those which are
intrastate under the regulation of state governments, except,
insofar as the Federal government may regulate intrastate busi-
nesses as an incident to the regulation of interstate business. 7
These businesses are so numerous and so great and the problems
involved in their regulation are so complicated that the problem
of regulation is one which requires the highest intelligence and
special aptitude. It would not have been difficult to solve the
problem if the public utility owners had cooperated in every way
in helping to make the solution possible. Since their attitude has
been antagonistic it has made the problem doubly difficult. Per-
haps it would be better to say that the public utility com-
panies have defeated public regulation. They have got around
the provision in regard to the rate of return by the device of
obtaining for the common stockholders the difference between
what is paid preferred stockholders and bondholders and what
the courts uphold as a reasonable rate, and by the device of
having the common stock owned by a holding company financed
6 94 U. S. 113.
7 Shreveport Case, 234 U. S. 342; Interstate Pub. Serv. Comm. v.
Attleboro Co., 273 U. S. 83; Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U. S. 306.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
by the issuance of preferred stock and bonds. 8 By the device
of padding the rate base, through excessive estimates and allow-
ances for payment of bonds, and purchase of additional equip-
ment and extensions out of earnings, and by the adoption of the
theory of reproduction cost by the United States Supreme Court,
the public utilities have obtained a rate base which is nearly
double what the original cost of most of the plants in the coun-
try was.9 Many other promotion schemes and schemes of high
finance, shown by Professor Ripley,' 0 have been resorted to. As
a consequence of the opposition of public utility men, the person-
nel of commissions, and the inherent difficulty of governmental
regulation of public callings, the people of the country are be-
ginning to come to the conclusion that governmental regulation
has proved a failure. They feel that what they want is cheap
gas, cheap electricity, and other services of public utilities at
a cheaper price than they are now getting them. They see what
cheap electricity, for example, would do to transform our social
and economic life. They see how all of the homes in the South
could be cooled in summer time in that case, just as now the
houses in the North are heated in the winter time. They know
from the history of other experiments that if the matter were
managed differently it would be possible to obtain cheap elec-
tricity and other services at cheaper prices. Yet they see that
the day of cheap electricity, for example, has apparently forever
passed away in the United States.
Because of this fact, the theory of government ownership,
either with government operation or with private operation
under government contract, instead of under the police power
and the due process clause, is coming into prominence. This
method of handling the problem has been championed by former
Governor Smith and by Governor Roosevelt. It is thought by
these and other men who champion government ownership that
it would be easier to solve the problem of obtaining the services
s Cohen: Confiscatory Rates and Modern Finance, 39 Yale L. J. 151.
9 Excess Income of St. Louis & O'Fallon Ry. Co., 124 I. C. C. 4.
10 From Main Street to Wall Street, Atl. 137; 94-108, Jan. '26; More
Light-and Power, too, Atl. 138: 667-87, Nov. '26; More Power to the Bank-
ers, Nation 121: 618-19, Dec. 2, '25; On with Railway Consolidation, World's
Work 52: 41-8, May '26; Railroads: Recent Books and Neglected Problems,
Q. J. Econ. 40: 152-66, Nov. '25; Remedies for Eradicating Big Business
Evils, World's Work 53: 128-38, Dec. '26; Stop, Look, Listen, Atl. 138: 380-
99, Sept. 26.
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needed by society from the businesses now classed as public
callings in one of these two ways. In favor of government own-
ership and operation, the Ontario experiment is cited, where
electricity is obtained at nearly one-fourth of the cost which the
people in many of the United States have to pay." In favor of
government ownership with private operation, unde,- contract
with the government, it is argued that all of the relations be-
tween the private business and the government-the people
whom they would have to serve, the facilities they would have to
furnish, the freedom from discrimination, and their rates and
their liability-could all be determined by contract, and that in
this way the constitutional difficulties and technicalities which
have developed in connection with the regulation of public call-
ings under the due process clause would be avoided, and that
once all these matters were provided for in a contract the con-
tract would be protected by the constitution itself against im-
pairment by subsequent legislation. Of course this argument
rests upon the assumption that the contract for the government
would be made not only by men who were legal experts, but by
men who were honest and incorruptible, and that the Supreme
Court will not further modify the doctrine of the Dartmouth
College case.12
It will have to be admitted that the choice is either between
government regulation under the law of public callings or public
ownership with either public operation or private operation
under contract. Governmental regulation is at the cross-roads.
If utility men had tried as hard to obey the law of public call-
ings as public utility commissioners have tried to enforce it,
governmental regulation might by this time have proven a won-
derful success. Since this has not been the case, now either a
more colossal effort must be made on the part of government,
or government regulation must be abandoned as a governmental
policy. If governmental regulation is abandoned, nothing re-
mains but government ownership, either with government op-
eration or with private operation under a contract with the
government. There are no other courses open to the American
people.
Indiana University Law School. HUGH E. WILLIS.
" State Seraice Magazine, Albany, N. Y. Jan. 1930.
12 4 Wheat. 518.
